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A list of all the posts and pages found on the site. For you robots out there is an XML version available for digesting as well.
Pages
About me
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Posts
Future Blog Post
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Blog Post number 4
Published:
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Blog Post number 3
Published:
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Blog Post number 2
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Blog Post number 1
Published:
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portfolio
Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting
Abstract
Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid violence against civilians by inviting them to peace talks.
State Oppression, Activist Propaganda, and Support for Militancy
Abstract
Illegal militants and legal activists often co-exist within dissident movements. Why do the sympathizers of a movement support militancy given the existence of an activist organization affiliated with the movement? In this paper, I argue that activist agitative propaganda promoting peaceful means to mobilize supporters diminishes support for militancy. Activist organizations' emotional messages promoting civil resistance and non-violent struggle, which I call agitative propaganda, can curb the support for the militants' armed campaign.
The Impact of Court Packing on Turkish Constitutional Court Decisions
Abstract
Using an original and comprehensive dataset, I measure Turkish Constitutional Court justices' ideal points in a two dimensional ideology space. I show that justices' ideologies and background characteristics are significant determinants of their votes and dissents in annulment action cases between 2002 and 2016. The more restrainist and liberal a justice is, the more likely they will vote for the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation. The main question this study seeks to answer is whether the impact of justices' ideologies on their votes has been significantly different after the act of court packing in 2010. The analyses show that the probability of voting for the unconstitutionality of AKP legislation between 2010 and 2016 is significantly lower than the cases between 2002 and 2010.
publications
The Impact of Court Packing on the Turkish Constitutional Court Decisions
Published in Journal 1, 2009
This paper is about the number 1. The number 2 is left for future work.
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2009). "Paper Title Number 1." Journal 1. 1(1). http://academicpages.github.io/files/paper1.pdf
Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting
Published in , 2010
Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid violence against civilians by inviting them to peace talks.
talks
Talk 1 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
Published:
This is a description of your talk, which is a markdown files that can be all markdown-ified like any other post. Yay markdown!
Conference Proceeding talk 3 on Relevant Topic in Your Field
Published:
This is a description of your conference proceedings talk, note the different field in type. You can put anything in this field.
teaching
Teaching experience 1
Undergraduate course, University 1, Department, 2014
This is a description of a teaching experience. You can use markdown like any other post.
Teaching experience 2
Workshop, University 1, Department, 2015
This is a description of a teaching experience. You can use markdown like any other post.